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Abstract 
This article explores the use of standardized tests to hold schools accountable. The 
history of testing for accountability is reviewed, and it is shown that currently 
between-school differences account for less than ten percent of the variance in 
student scores, in part because the progress of individuals is small compared to the 
spread of achievement within an age cohort, and, possibly, due to lack of alignment 
between instruction and assessment. A review of the literature on the effects of the 
introduction of such tests in high-stakes accountability regimes suggests that the 
effects can be positive, and the size of the effects is substantial. Therefore, while the 
validity of such tests may be problematic in terms of the intended inferences, their 
introduction may nevertheless be justified by their impact. The paper concludes with 






Assessment is a key process in education. It is only through assessment that we can 
find out whether instruction has had its intended effect, because even the best-
designed instruction cannot be guaranteed to be effective (see, for example, Denvir & 
Brown, 1986a, b). 
 
One might expect, therefore, that assessment should be reasonably uncontroversial. 
All those with a stake in the outcomes of education—learners, teachers, parents, other 
taxpayers, employers, and the wider community—want to know what students have 
learned, and it seems plausible that this can easily be evaluated through the use of 
straightforward and familiar instruments, such as achievement tests. 
 
However, as H. L. Mencken warned almost a century ago, “There is always an easy 
solution to every human problem: neat, plausible, and wrong.” (Mencken, 1917). In 
this article, I explore the use of standardized tests in high-stakes accountability 
systems, and specifically, I argue that the systems currently in use have significant 
shortcomings that call into question some of the interpretations that are routinely 
based on the scores yielded by these tests. 
 
Of course tests are designed for a variety of purposes, and their results are used in a 
variety of ways. One common classification of tests distinguishes between diagnostic, 
norm-referenced, and criterion-referenced tests. These terms are, of course, more 
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properly applied to the kinds of interpretations that are made on the basis of the test 
scores rather than to the test itself but the term “criterion-referenced test” can 
certainly be used as a shorthand term for a test designed to support criterion-
referenced inferences. However, it is important to bear in mind that it is the 
inferences, rather than the test that are criterion-referenced. 
 
This distinction is particularly important in view of the fact that test scores are often 
interpreted in ways that differ significantly from those intended by the designers of 
the test. Tests designed to support norm-referenced inferences about the level of 
achievement in, say, fourth grade mathematics, are used to make inferences about the 
extent to which students have mastered the fourth grade content standards for 
mathematics in their state. Conversely, tests designed to support criterion-referenced 
inferences about a student’s mastery of fourth-grade content standards for 
mathematics are used to make inferences about the adequacy of education provided 
by the district. 
 
My aim in this article is to take one specific application of testing—the use of 
standardized achievement tests for the purpose of holding teachers, schools and 
districts accountable—and to explore the extent to which the tests currently in use are 
able to support valid inferences about the quality of education provided. 
 
I begin by discussing the idea of accountability, and then review briefly the history of 
testing for accountability within public schools. The key assumption of accountability 
testing is that differences in the achievement of students on standardized tests should 
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be primarily attributable to differences in the quality of education received by 
students, and so, in subsequent sections, I investigate the extent to which this is the 
case. I show that differences in the quality of schooling account for only a small 
proportion of the variation in student outcomes (in most countries, less that ten 
percent) primarily because the cumulative effect of differences in the average rate at 
which individual students learn results in a situation in which the progress of an 
individual student in a year is much smaller than the variability of achievement within 
an age cohort. Any inferences that differences in student scores on standardized tests 
therefore primarily reflect differences in quality of education received are therefore 
problematic. However, the evidence from comparisons between states within the US, 
and of comparisons of different national systems, suggests that high-stakes 
accountability systems can have a positive impact on student learning. The article 
therefore concludes with some reflections on how high-stakes accountability systems 
might be designed more effectively. 
 
Accountability 
The word “accountability” is used in a wide range of contexts, and has a number of 
different meanings. To be accountable can mean to be responsible, to be answerable, 
to be blameworthy, or even to be liable. However, the literal meaning of the term—
that of being “held to account”—suggests there is an expectation that when a person, 
organization or entity is accountable, they can be expected or required to render an 
account of their actions (or inaction). The two immediate questions that follow are “to 
whom?” and “for what?” (Wescott, 1972; Bardach & Lesser, 1996). 
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If schools are to be accountable, to whom should they be accountable? The obvious 
answer is to those who pay for the provision of the service, and to those who consume 
it. It is common in much political debate within the United States to assume that this 
means taxpayers (who pay for the service) and parents (who are generally regarded, 
especially within discourses of school choice, as being the consumers), although of 
course these are often the same people. Further removed, but still regarded as having 
a legitimate stake in the outcomes of education, are employers, educational 
institutions subsequently attended by students, and, in recent years, the students 
themselves. However, when education fails, the social and financial costs are borne by 
the whole of society. Even retired people who earn too little to pay tax will bear the 
costs of failures in the education system, through increased crime (Levin et al., 2007; 
Carneiro, Crawford & Goodman, 2007) and lower levels of engagement in citizenship 
and other forms of “pro-social” behavior (Feinstein, Budge, Vorhaus & Duckworth, 
2008). However, while teachers, schools and districts should therefore be accountable 
to all those who have a stake in society, it is still necessary for some agency to take 
responsibility for the design of the accountability system, for reviewing the 
information it produces, and for taking any necessary action. 
 
A brief history of accountability testing 
There is nothing new in the idea that results of simple testing procedures could be 
used to hold students and their teachers to account. Up to the end of the first third of 
the 19th century, public schools in England and Wales had been financed by voluntary 
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(and in general, religious) organizations.  Between 1833 and 1853, the role of the 
state in funding education was expanded greatly, through the introduction of grants 
for the erection of new buildings, for the training of teachers, and for the 
encouragement of attendance, first in rural schools, and then in all schools. In 1858, a 
Royal Commission was set up, under the chairmanship of the Duke of Newcastle, “to 
inquire into the state of popular education in England and to consider what measures 
were required for the extension of sound and cheap instruction to all classes”. The 
Commission’s report, published in 1861, recommended, among other things, that the 
amount of public money paid to each elementary school should depend on three 
factors: the condition of the school buildings, student attendance, and the 
performance of the students attending the school in an oral examination, undertaken 
by one of the national school inspectors, of every child in every school to which grants 
were to be paid (Royal Commission, 1861). This system—which perhaps predictably 
came to be known as “payment by results”—has been the subject of much analysis 
and debate. Some  (e.g., Hurt, 1971 p. 222) have argued that the focus on reading and 
arithmetic was essential to breaking the monopoly of the religious schools, and 
furthermore, that making schools and teachers accountable through the use of 
objective measures of achievement was necessary to demonstrate to the wider public 
the political case for investment in publicly-funded elementary education (e.g., Hurt, 
1971; Sylvester 1974; Mitch, 1999). Others (e.g., Rapple, 1994) have countered that 
the damage done by the high-stakes accountability regime was worse than the 
problem it was trying to address: 
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true accountability in education should not be facilely linked to mechanical 
examination results, for there is a very distinct danger that the pedagogical 
methods employed to attain those results will themselves be mechanical and the 
education of children will be so much the worse. (p. 21) 
 
In the United States, at the same time, there were many who were concerned about 
the damage done, both to students and teachers, by the introduction of “high-stakes” 
assessments. In his Elements of Pedagogy, Emerson E. White considered “the propriety 
of making the results of written examinations the basis for the bestowment of 
scholastic rewards and honors, for the promotion and classification of pupils and for 
determining the comparative standing or success of schools and teachers.” (White, 
1886 p. 198) His conclusion was forthright: 
 
They have perverted the best efforts of teachers, and narrowed and grooved their 
instruction; they have occasioned and made well-nigh imperative the use of 
mechanical and rote methods of teaching; they have occasioned cramming and the 
most vicious habits of study; they have caused much of the overpressure charged 
upon schools, some of which is real; they have tempted both teachers and pupils to 
dishonesty; and last but not least, they have permitted a mechanical method of 
school supervision. (pp. 199-200) 
 
Haertel and Herman (2005) provide a brief overview of the last century of 
accountability testing in the United States. They conclude: 
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From the days of Joseph Rice and the school testing programs of the early 1900s, 
through the Head Start program evaluations of the 1960s, and up to the 
increasingly prescriptive testing requirements of successive ESEA [Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act] reauthorizations culminating in NCLB [the 2001 No Child 
Left Behind Act] policymakers have used tests in an attempt to discover which 
schools and districts are fulfilling their responsibilities and which are falling short. 
(pp. 28-29) 
 
One of the distinctive features of these approaches to “testing for accountability” in 
the United States is that the stakes were much higher for teachers than for students. 
Indeed, apart from any actions that teachers might have taken against students who 
performed badly on these tests, there were no repercussions at all for the students. 
Tests that are high stakes for teachers but low stakes for students have been widely 
used in the United States for many years, but are relatively rare in other developed 
and developing countries, where the testing regimes are either low stakes for teachers 
and high stakes for students or high-stakes for both. The reasons for the divergence in 
practice between the United States on the one hand and what I shall call here the 
European tradition in testing (which for these purposes includes Japan) are complex, 
and beyond the scope of this article. However, one factor appears to be particularly 




Upper secondary schooling: divergent aspirations 
Within the European tradition, at least up until the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, education beyond the age of 15 or 16 was intended only for the small 
proportion of the national population planning to enter higher education  (typically 
only five or ten percent). As a result, the assessment arrangements in place at the end 
of high school were determined by the universities, and provided a de facto 
curriculum for upper secondary schools. Indeed, what is called the “syllabus” in 
secondary schools in England is simply a list of all the things that can be tested in the 
examination. Alignment between curriculum and instruction was total, since the only 
purpose of being in school beyond the statutory leaving age was in order to pursue 
entry to a university, and therefore for most students, the curriculum consisted 
entirely of test preparation. 
 
The assessment was also standards-based in that the assessment was largely, if not 
entirely, based on achievement on timed, constructed-response, achievement tests 
based on carefully prescribed syllabuses. Secondary education systems in Europe 
have the appearance of being designed backwards from the point of selection into 
higher education with a series of “hurdles” for the student to clear (e.g., selection into 
a Gymnasium at the age of 10 in Germany; selection into a selective “grammar school” 
in England at the age of 11; selection into one of the most prestigious middle schools 
in Japan). 
 
In contrast, in the United States, there appears to have been a widespread consensus 
about the value of education up to the age of 18 as a general preparation for 
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adulthood, complete in and of itself, which led to the extraordinary expansion of 
secondary education in the United States between 1910 and 1940 (Goldin, 2002 p. 
25). Because high school was intended for all students, it would have been 
inappropriate to assess students against standards intended for the small proportion 
going on to higher education. Moreover, within the United States, the process of 
selection to a higher education institution and placement in a particular program were 
separate, so that it was possible to select on the basis of general aptitude, delaying the 
placement decision for a year or two. In most European universities, the processes of 
selection and placement are combined—one cannot apply for a place at a particular 
university without specifying a particular program—so that universities need to 
establish an applicant’s aptitude for a particular program before deciding whether to 
admit the applicant or not. 
 
There were some states, such as New York, that imposed state-wide university 
entrance examinations, but for the rest of the United States, high-school graduation 
requirements were generally determined by districts. In the 1970s, a number of states 
introduced minimum competency tests for graduation (see Madaus, 1983, for a 
summary), but as Pipho (2002) points out, even here, the extent to which these tests 
have been high-stakes for the students has varied considerably, and in many districts, 
schools continued with curricula that were only weakly aligned with the standardized 
tests routinely used to hold schools accountable. Why the use of such standardized 
multiple-choice tests persisted in the United States, despite the poor alignment with 
what schools were teaching, when such tests are largely anathema in other rich 
countries (Wood, 1991) is obviously not a simple question, and probably involves 
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matters of cultural preference as much as technical matters such as reliability and 
other aspects of validity (Black & Wiliam, 2005). Whatever the reason, the 
consequences of this lack of alignment are discussed in the section entitled “Why are 
relative school effects so small?” below.  
 
The logic of accountability testing 
The logic of accountability testing is deceptively simple. Students attending higher-
quality schools will  (by definition) have higher achievement than those attending 
lower-quality schools, so that differences in the quality of schooling will result in 
systematic differences in achievement between schools. Provided the accountability 
tests assess school achievement, then higher test scores will indicate higher-quality 
schooling. However, what is required for school accountability is the converse: that 
higher student scores are indicative of higher-quality schooling. 
 
As Messick (1989) has pointed out, this is a matter of validity, which he defined as “an 
integrative evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and 
theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and 
actions based on test scores or other modes of assessment.” (p. 13) In Messick’s 
formulation, the two main threats to valid inference based on test scores are  
 construct under-representation and construct-irrelevant variance. The former occurs 
when test scores fail to represent adequately differences in student achievement on 
the construct of interest, and the latter occurs when differences in student 
achievement are not related to the construct of interest (put simply, construct under-
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representation indicates an assessment that is too limited, in that it fails to assess 
things it should, while construct-irrelevant variance indicates an assessment that is 
too large, in that it assesses things that it should not). In the specific context of 
accountability testing, construct under-representation is minimized by ensuring that, 
as far as possible, the tests assess what schools are intended to develop in their 
students, while construct-irrelevant variance is minimized by seeking to ensure 
that differences in student scores are related to differences in the quality of schooling 
received, rather than differences in the students’ aptitude, socioeconomic status and 
so on. 
 
The rise and fall of authentic assessment in the United States 
It was a concern with a form of construct under-representation—that standardized 
tests (and particularly many of the “minimum competency” introduced in the 1970s) 
were not assessing all important aspects of school achievement—that led, in the 
1980s and 1990s, to increased interest in the assessment of so-called “authentic 
work,” often through portfolios of student work. Although there is evidence that such 
approaches can have significant positive impact on student learning (Newmann, Bryk 
& Nagaoka, 2001), it is also clear that such approaches fell far short of traditional 
standardized tests in psychometric terms—especially in respect of reliability (Koretz, 
Stecher, Klein, McCaffrey & Deibert, 1994). This, combined with the high cost of such 
assessment, led most states either to completely discontinue the use of constructed 
response assessments, or to scale back their use substantially. 
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On January 8th, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the 2001 No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) Act (technically a re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, first signed into law in April 1965, with major changes introduced 
through reauthorizations in 1967, 1981 and 1994). Although unprecedented in its 
powers, and in the detail in which its provisions were laid out, NCLB can be seen as an 
evolution of previous attempts to use high-stakes tests to improve educational 
outcomes. Like its predecessors, the stakes are much greater for teachers, schools and 
districts than they are for individual students1. It focuses on the performance of 
successive cohorts of students, rather than individual students, so that in each school, 
what matters is that the proportion of each student in each grade (from third to eighth 
grade) achieving proficiency (however it is defined by the state) increases each year, 
and reaches 100% by 2014. 
 
At the heart of NCLB is the logic of accountability testing outlined above: differences 
between students in terms of their educational outcomes, as measured by the tests, 
should be largely, if not wholly, attributable to differences in the quality of education 
provided by schools. Whether such inferences are valid depend on the extent to which 
the tests used adequately represent the construct of interest (what schools are 
designed to develop in their students) and the extent to which differences in test 
scores represent differences in the quality of schooling, rather than other factors. 
 
Whether accountability tests adequately represent the construct of interest is a 
complex matter, requiring a clear definition of the construct of interest (see Wiliam, 
2010), which is beyond the scope of this article. The remainder of this article focuses 
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on the issue of construct-irrelevant variance; to what extent do differences in test 
scores represent differences in the quality of schooling provided (construct relevant 
variance) rather than other factors, such as the amount of parental support, 
differences in the prior achievement of students on entering the school system, and so 
on (construct-irrelevant variance)? 
 
What are the sources of variability in test scores? 
For over a hundred years, researchers have explored sources of variability in test 
scores (Spearman, 1904; Mackintosh, 2000; Deary, Strand, Smith & Fernandes, 2007). 
Some of these studies have tried to disentangle the effects of some measure of general 
intelligence from socioeconomic status, but when tests are used to hold schools 
accountable, such distinctions are much less important than how much of the 
variation in test scores is between schools and how much is within schools. This is 
because if differences in test scores are due to differences in school quality, then the 
proportion of variance that is between schools provides an upper bound on the 
proportion of variance that is attributable to school quality. This is an upper bound, 
because systematic differences in, for example, levels of school funding will also 
contribute to between-school variation, but is not a matter that the individual school 
can influence (although in most states, the district can). 
 
As part of its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has developed a 
range of measures of student knowledge and skills, specifically focusing on reading, 
 15 
mathematical, and scientific literacy (OECD, 2000). The development of the 
framework for assessment, and of the measures, is summarized in McGaw (2008). The 
purpose of PISA was to answer broad questions about the quality of education 
systems, such as: 
 
How well are young adults prepared to meet the challenges of the future? Are they 
able to analyse, reason and communicate their ideas effectively? Do they have the 
capacity to continue learning throughout life? Parents, students the public and 
those who run education systems need to know the answers to these questions 
(OECD, 2000, p. 3). 
 
In order to address these questions, an explicit decision was taken within PISA not to 
attempt to assess the extent to which student had mastered knowledge and skills 
specified in their curricula that shaped their schooling, as, for example, had been a 
clear focus within the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) program 
(Mullis, Martin, Ruddock, O’Sullivan, Arora, & Erberber, 2005). Instead, PISA focused 
on the capacity of a specific population of students—those reaching the end of 
compulsory schooling— to reflect on and use the skills they have developed (McGaw, 
2008). 
 
One particularly significant strand of analysis within PISA was to apportion the 
variance in student scores on the PISA tests into between-school and within-school 
variance components. In the 2003 mathematics assessment, variance in student 
achievement in the United States was about 5% larger than the average of the 
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participating countries, approximately one fourth (25.7%) of the variance being 
between schools, and three-fourths of the variance was within schools. It might be 
assumed that this between-school variance represents the “school effect”—the 
difference in student achievement that is attributable to the school, but in the United 
States, students are not randomly allocated to schools, so that the between-school 
variance includes both the “school effect” and systematic differences in the students 
attending different schools (in the United States, more affluent students are clustered 
together, as are less affluent students). In order to investigate the extent to which 
between-school differences were caused by differences in the composition of the 
students attending the school, rather than differences in school quality, PISA 
developed an international index of economic, social and cultural status. Using this 
index, it was found that more than two-thirds (69%) of the between-school variance 
was accounted for by differences in the social class of the individual students and by 
further contributions of the average social class of other students attending the school 
(sometimes called “compositional” effects). This means that no more than 8% (31% of 
25.7%) of the total variance in mathematics achievement of 15-year-olds in the USA 
was attributable to the quality of the education provided by the school (OECD, 2004). 
The results in science are similar (OECD, 2007). 
 
Now of course this does not mean that schooling does not make a difference. In the 
countries surveyed in PISA schooling up to the age of 15 is practically universal, so we 
are not comparing students who have, and have not been educated. We are therefore 
unable to draw any inferences from these data about the effects of schooling. 
However, it is reasonable to draw inferences about the extent to which variations in 
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student achievement is associated with variations in the quality of schooling, which is 
one of the main purposes stated by advocates of high-stakes accountability testing—
the idea is that differences in test scores are indicative of differences in the quality of 
education provided. 
 
Whether measures of student achievement for purposes of accountability should 
control for compositional effects—and specifically the extent to which high-achieving 
students increase the achievement of other students alongside whom they are 
taught—is not straightforward. As has been recognized for some time (Wiliam, 1992; 
Willms, 1992) different audiences for school accountability data will require different 
kinds of analyses. Parents choosing schools for their children may well not want 
measures of school performance to control for compositional effects—put bluntly 
they may not care whether their children do well because they are well taught or 
because there are other able children at the school who increase the achievement of 
others around them. On the other hand, it seems unfair to reward some schools and 
sanction others simply for their success (or lack of it) in attracting high-achieving 
students. 
 
Value-added measures of school effectiveness 
In England, over the past ten years, there has been a substantial investment of effort 
in the development of ways of disaggregating some of the factors contributing to the 
progress made by students at schools. This work has been greatly facilitated by the 
“vertical design” of the national curriculum in England, which focuses on learning 
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progressions over time, rather than allocating different aspects of content to different 
grades (Wiliam, 2007). 
 
Achievement of 16-year-olds in England is measured primarily through a set of 
national examinations entitled the General Certificate of Secondary Education, or 
GCSE, although many vocational programmes are also available. Most students sit 
examinations in 12 to 14 subjects at GCSE, and their results are reported on a nine-
point scale (U, G, F, E, D, C, B, A, A*), the grades being derived by setting cut-scores on 
a continuous scale involving a weighted combination of scores derived from 
externally set examination papers and school-based assessment (the balance between 
the two differs for different subjects). The most common measure of school 
performance for secondary schools in England—and the one that is featured in 
national daily newspapers when the results are published—is the proportion of the 
age-16 cohort at the school achieving one of the four highest grades (C, B, A, A*) in 
English, mathematics and at least three other subjects in the GCSE, often abbreviated 
to “5 A* to C including English and mathematics.”  This proportion varies from close to 
zero in schools catering predominantly for students with profound special needs up to 
100% for highly selective schools. 
 
For many years there has been a concern that such an index is difficult to interpret. Do 
high scores indicate high-quality schooling, or simply a school that attracts high-
achieving students? To address these concerns, a number of approaches to 
distinguishing the contributions of the school from other factors, such as the prior 
attainment of the students, have been explored.  
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In the United States, such “value-added” approaches have, in general, been more 
directed towards the identification of the effects of individual teachers on student 
achievement, often designed to support differentiated compensation (see, for 
example, Braun, 2005) although within the last two years, pilots of value-added 
approaches to determining whether a school has made “adequate yearly progress” 
towards the goals established by the state under the No Child Left Behind Act have 
been authorized. In contrast, in England, most approaches to value-added have 
focused on school-level, rather than teacher-level effects. 
 
Value-added analyses of school performance have been greatly assisted by the fact 
that the national curriculum for England was designed in terms of “learning 
progressions” (Wiliam, 2007; Heritage, 2008), and a number of relatively simple 
models for estimating the contribution of the school to a student’s achievement have 
been developed (Wiliam, 1992, Jesson & Crossley, 2007). 
 
The earliest models used for reporting on the value-added by secondary schools 
converted the best eight grades achieved by a student at GCSE (or the equivalent 
vocational programmes) into a numerical score (0, 16, 22, 28, 34, 40, 46, 52 and 58 
respectively for the nine grades) and regressed the total score on a similar measure 
based on the scores achieved by the student in the national tests at age 11. For each 
student, a residual was calculated, and the relative “value-added” by the school was 
simply the average of the residuals for all students in the age 16 cohort (for further 
details of the procedure, see Ray, 2006 and Kent & Blows, 2009). Analysis of these 
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models revealed that a significant proportion of the variance attributed to the school 
was due to contextual factors (e.g., girls had larger residuals than boys, so that the 
higher value-added estimates for single-sex girls’ schools were in part due to the 
differences in intake rather than differences in school quality) and so a number of 
refinements have been made to the original model to produce an estimate of the so-
called “contextualized value added” provided by the school. 
 
In addition to prior attainment, the model currently in use includes adjustments to the 
predictions for each student to take into account sex, ethnicity, poverty (as measured 
by entitlement to free school meals, and an area-based measure of the proportion of 
households on low incomes), the extent of any special educational needs, English 
language proficiency and a number of other smaller adjustments (Ray, 2006).  It was 
also discovered that the relationship between achievement at age 11 and achievement 
at age 16 was not linear but curved slightly upwards (when achievement at 11 is 
plotted on the x-axis and achievement at 16 is plotted on the y-axis). The CVA model 
also therefore includes a quadratic term, so that the achievement at age 11 and the 
square of the achievement at age 11 are fed into the model to improve the fit of the 
model. The resulting measure of contextualized value-added (CVA) is reported on a 
scale anchored to the grades of the GCSE, so that the score for a school is reasonably 
easily interpretable2. 
 
For the 4158 schools in England that had students taking the GCSE in 2007, the 
correlation between the most common outcome measure—the proportion of students 
in a cohort achieving at least a grade C in 5 subjects in the GCSE—and the CVA 
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measure was 0.27, indicating that the school effect contributes only around 7% of the 
variance in student outcomes: quite close to the 8% estimate generated by PISA for 
the United States. Put another way, one standard deviation of school quality (as 
measured by CVA) equates to about one-fifth of a standard deviation of student 
achievement. Since the proportion of students at a school gaining five good grades at 
GCSE including English and Mathematics is based on a discrete measure (each student 
at a school either does, or does not, achieve this), the correlation between this and the 
CVA will be attenuated to some extent, but since the vast majority of schools have at 
least 150 students in an age cohort, the reduction in correlation is likely to be small, if 
not negligible. Differences in school quality, both in the United Kingdom and in the 
United States, would therefore appear to contribute relatively little to the differences 
in student achievement. 
 
The remainder of this article explores some possible reasons why relative school 
effects contribute so little to student outcomes, and what happens when standardized 
tests are used to hold schools accountable. The article does not deal, therefore, with 
broader notions of accountability (see, for example, Darling-Hammond, 2006) nor 
does it deal with the idea that accountability should be a “two-way street” in which 
schools are accountable to the community for student outcomes, but also where the 
community is accountable to the school for the provision of adequate resources for 
the task (Chambers, Parrish, Levin, Smith, Guthrie, Seder & Taylor, 2004) through so-
called “adequacy lawsuits” (Hanushek, 2006). These are important issues, but beyond 
the scope of the present article. 
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Why are relative school effects small? 
There are many reasons why between-school effects account for a relatively small 
proportion of the variance in student test scores. Any student score will involve some 
error, and this will reduce the between-school variance. In addition, no measure will 
perfectly capture the kinds of changes that schools effect in their students. Where the 
alignment between the test and the curriculum is particularly poor, scores on the test 
will substantially under-represent the construct of interest, namely mastery of the 
curriculum, so that the scores of students experiencing higher-quality schooling 
(defined as schooling producing better mastery of the specified curriculum) will not 
necessarily be higher than those experiencing lower-quality schooling. In this section, 
I explore in detail a further reason, namely that the rate of progress of individual 
learners is small in comparison with the range of achievement within a cohort. 
Specifically, I show that the range of achievement within an age cohort can be ten or 
fifteen times greater than the amount learned by a typical individual in a year. The 
result is that even large increases in the rate at which individual students learn will 
produce small increases in the proportion of variance in student outcome measures 
attributable to the school. 
 
The Leverhulme Numeracy Research Programme (LNRP) administered a series of 
numeracy tests to two cohorts of elementary school students in England over a four-
year period. One cohort began in kindergarten, and the other began in third grade, and 
each participating student was tested twice each year (in October and May or June). In 
order to make the tests appropriate for students of different ages, the tests varied 
from grade to grade, but eleven items were used across five grades, allowing the 
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increase in facility for a particular item to be tracked from kindergarten to fifth grade.  
One item (code 1106), presented orally to students in first through fifth grade, asked 
students to complete the following calculation: 
 
“Eight hundred and sixty add five hundred and seventy”1 
 
Although the item was presented orally, students were provided with scratch paper 
for calculation, and were asked to write their answer in a space given to them in the 
test booklet. The facility of the item for students of different ages is as shown 
graphically in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
One interesting feature of Figure 1 is how slowly the facility of this item increases 
with age. Approximately twenty percent of students can answer the item correctly by 
the age of 8, but three years later, thirty percent still cannot. The testing of the 
students was undertaken as part of a research program within which teachers and 
students were guaranteed anonymity. The test was therefore low-stakes for both 
teachers and students. Since this was a nationally representative sample, and since the 
timing of the test was not keyed to any curricular coverage of the specific skills being 
tested, it seems reasonable to assume that this is a fairly accurate indication of the 
“response to treatment” under conditions of typical instruction. One explanation for 
                                                        
1
 This is the correct form of expression for these numbers in British English. 
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the relatively small increase in facility over time could be that this was not a skill that 
teachers taught. However, in a teacher questionnaire, all teachers participating in the 
program were asked to indicate, for each item, whether the skills being assessed were 
skills they sought to develop in students, and almost all teachers (well over 90%) 
indicated that the skill tested by this item was something they taught and reviewed 
regularly with students. Furthermore, since the sharpest increases in facility occur 
between October and June, rather than between June and October, it seems likely that 
attendance at school, rather than general maturation, is the main cause of the increase 
in facility. 
 
Of course this is just a single isolated item, but across the 159 items used in the LNRP 
tests across the six grades, the average annual increase in facility was just sixteen 
percentage points. Each of these items was regarded as grade-appropriate for the 
grade in which it was tested, and the teachers agreed that the item assessed a skill 
that they were trying to develop in their students that year. For the easier items, there 
will be “ceiling effects”—once the facility exceeds 84%, then of course increasing the 
facility by sixteen percentage points is impossible. However, even if we exclude the 
items with facility greater than 85%, then the average annual increase in facility is 
only twenty-five percentage points. In a class of 24 students, an annual increase of 
item facility of twenty-five percentage points suggests that only six students are 
acquiring the skill in any given year. The other 18 students in the class would either 
already know it at the beginning of the year, or still would not know it at the end of 
the year.  
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The fundamental idea here—that the rate of progress of individual students is slow 
compared to the range of achievement within an age cohort—is not new. Two reports 
from the Assessment of Performance Unit (APU) in the United Kingdom (roughly 
similar in purpose to the National Assessment of Educational Progress or NAEP in the 
USA) in 1980 had shown that high-achieving 7-year-old students out-performed some 
14-year-olds on basic arithmetic. One item in particular: 
 
6099 + 1 = ? 
 
gained some notoriety when it was found that there were many 14-year-olds who 
thought the answer was 7000, while many 7-year-olds knew the answer to be 6100 
(Foxman, Cresswell, Ward, Badger, Tuson & Bloomfield, 1980; Foxman, Martini, Tuson 
& Cresswell, 1980). One influential official inquiry branded this phenomenon as a 
“seven-year-gap” between the lowest and highest achieving students in a middle-
school mathematics class (Committee of Inquiry into the Teaching of Mathematics in 
Schools, 1982). 
 
Other studies of mathematical abilities in school students showed the same, or even 
greater, variability than had been found by the APU. The Concepts in Secondary 
Mathematics and Science (CSMS) project had identified a series of six age-
independent levels of understanding of decimals, and, in a nationally representative 
sample, found that the variability within each age cohort was much greater than the 
differences between cohorts (Hart, 1981). In particular, in a cross-sectional study of 
achievement, involving at least 500 students at each age point, the proportion of 
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students achieving a particular level increased by no more than 10% per year (see 
Figure 2). These studies were recently replicated, and while there were some 
noticeable changes (for example, success rates on items assessing decimals had 
improved, while scores on items assessing fractions had deteriorated), the overall 
variability of achievement had changed little (Hodgen, Küchemann, Brown & Coe, 
2009). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Brown, Blondel, Simon and Black (1995) found that in England, performance on 
conceptual issues involved in measuring length and weight (mass) were also slow to 
develop. There were some first-grade students who were well ahead of most students 
in seventh grade, suggesting that there may be as much as a “twelve-year gap” 
between the weakest and the strongest in a seventh grade science class, which is 
consistent with similarly-focused research in mathematics (Brown, 1992 p. 12).  
 
Such findings are also typical in the United States. In the mid-1950s the Cooperative 
Test Division at the Educational Testing Service produced a series of Sequential Tests 
of Educational Progress (STEP) in reading, writing, listening, social studies, 
mathematics and science (Educational Testing Service Cooperative Test Division, 
1957). The tests were aimed at students from 5th grade to the first two years of 
college, and were vertically scaled, permitting comparisons to be made across years. 
The annual increase in achievement in the STEP tests, measured in standard 
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deviations, is shown in Figure 3. Apart from the earliest and latest grades, the typical 
annual increase in achievement is between 0.3 and 0.4 standard deviations. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Other tests show similar properties. Petersen, Kolen and Hoover (1989) discuss the 
results of scaling the results from the Iowa test of basic skills (ITBS) language usage 
test (Hieronymous & Lindquist, 1974) for different cohorts of students. By definition, 
a median grade 3 student attains a grade equivalent of 3.5 half-way through the year. 
The data from the ITBS scaling studies indicate that about 30% of students will, by 
half way through grade 3, have achieved a score equivalent to that achieved by the 
median fourth-grader at the same time. In a very real sense, therefore, these 30% of 
students are at least one year ahead of the median student in their grade. Collecting 
similar data points for third graders and joining them up generates a “grade 
characteristic curve” for third grade. A similar analysis applied to students in other 
grades produces a series of such curves (see Petersen, Kolen & Hoover, 1989 p. 234). 
So, for example, in the ITBS language usage tests, the standard associated with 
average students half way through fourth grade is also just attained by the lowest 
attaining 5% of students in eighth grade, the lowest-attaining 10% of those in seventh 
grade, the lowest-attaining 18% of those in sixth grade, and the lowest-attaining 30% 
of those in fifth grade. On the other hand, the same standard is reached by the highest-
attaining 30% in third grade as noted above, and probably by some students in second 
grade, although this is not recorded. 
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One response to this line of argument is that such grade-to-grade comparisons are 
difficult to interpret, since strictly speaking, a grade-equivalent score has meaning 
only within that grade (as Petersen et al. point out). However, in domains such as 
reading and mathematics, it would seem rather odd to claim that a curriculum for one 
grade does not build on that for the previous grade, so that there is a sense that, even 
in language usage, some third-graders are performing like some eighth-graders and 
vice-versa. In the ITBS test, one year’s growth ranges from around 0.5 standard 
deviations in third-grade, to around 0.35 standard deviations in 8th grade, which is 
quite similar to the data for the STEP tests shown in Figure 3. 
 
 More recent data has confirmed that one year’s growth in achievement typically 
ranges from around 0.25 to 0.4 standard deviations. Rodriguez (2004) found that one 
year’s progress in middle-school mathematics on the tests used in TIMSS (Trends in 
Mathematics and Science Study) was equivalent to 0.36 standard deviations, while the 
average increase in achievement in mathematics from fourth-grade to eighth-grade on 
the assessments used in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is 
approximately one standard deviation (NAEP, 2006), suggesting that for the NAEP 
tests, one year’s growth is only about one-fourth of a standard deviation. 
 
Most recently, Wibowo, Hendrawan and Deville (2009) reported their attempts to 
design a vertical scale for the reporting of student achievement on accountability tests 
in Connecticut. While growth in fourth grade averaged over one standard deviation in 
mathematics, over the subsequent four years, the average growth in achievement in 
mathematics and reading was less than a third of a standard deviation (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 about here 
 
Moreover, these effects are not just limited to standardized tests in K-12 education. 
Norcini (2009) reports that in cardiac surgery, the effects of one year’s training is 
approximately equivalent to one-third of a standard deviation. 
 
The fact that the average effects of one year’s instruction, on a range of outcome 
measures including standardized tests, is often as little as a fourth of a standard 
deviation, typically around one third of a standard deviation, and rarely more than a 
half of a standard deviation, suggests that test scores are measuring much more than 
just the quality of instruction. After all, if these tests were measuring only the effects of 
instruction, then a naïve analysis would suggest that the gap between (say) the 
average achievement of cohorts of seventh grade and eighth grade students could be 
expected to be as much as four standard deviations on the grounds that those eighth 
graders receiving the least effective instruction should be performing no worse than 
those receiving no eighth grade instruction (i.e., seventh graders). 
 
To sum up so far, because the progress of individual students is slow compared to the 
variability of achievement within the age cohort, variance in students’ scores is much 
more strongly related to features over which schools have little influence, such as the 
prior achievement of students, than to the quality of the education provided by the 
school, and therefore are not well-suited to supporting inferences about the quality of 
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the education provided by a school. The next section deals with the impact of such 
tests on student outcomes. 
 
The impact of high-stakes accountability testing on student achievement 
An evaluation of the impact of NCLB is beyond the scope of this article, and in any 
case, would at this stage be premature. However, as the Obama administration 
considers the re-authorization of NCLB, it is useful to review briefly the existing 
research on the impact of high-stakes accountability testing on student achievement. 
 
It has been widely observed for many years that when any test (or indeed any other 
performance indicator) is made the focus of public policy attention, then performance 
as measured by that test improves—an effect known as Campbell’s Law in the United 
States (Campbell, 1976 p. 49) and Goodhart’s Law in the United Kingdom (Kellner, 
1997). Perhaps the best known example of this is the case documented in Koretz, 
Linn, Dunbar and Shepard (1991) in which it was found that a district’s scores on a 
newly introduced test started low, but improved steadily, while scores on the test 
whose use had been discontinued declined. In fact, Cannell (1988) found that all fifty 
states posted state averages above the national average, a situation that was 
described as the Lake Wobegon effect (after Garrison Keillor’s mythical town where 
all the women were strong, all the men were good looking, and all the children were 
above average). There is little doubt, therefore, that attaching high stakes to test 
outcomes can increase the scores on those tests. The important question, however, is 
whether such improvements generalize to other tests that are intended to measure 
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the same constructs, and in particular whether they generalize to remote and distal 
measures (Ruiz-Primo, Shavelson, Hamilton, Klein, 2002). 
 
In a widely reported analysis, Amrein and Berliner (2002a) examined the impact of 
the introduction of high-stakes testing programs in 18 states. They concluded that 
while there was clear evidence that associating high-stakes consequences to test score 
outcomes had increased scores on the tests used within the program, there was no 
evidence of improved test scores on other related measures, such as the College 
Board’s SAT and Advanced Placement tests, the ACT (formerly American College 
Testing) test and on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). 
Furthermore, they found that the introduction of high-stakes testing regimes was 
associated, in some cases, with increased student drop-out rates, inappropriate test 
preparation practices (up to and including cheating), and decreased teacher morale, 
leading to increased teacher defection from the profession. A subsequent analysis, 
involving the 27 states with the highest stakes associated with test score outcomes in 
grades 1 through 8 (Amrein and Berliner, 2002b) confirmed these findings, and also 
indicated that the introduction of high-school graduation examinations was 
associated with a lowering of average academic achievement. 
 
However, as Rosenshine (2003) pointed out, when results for the states with the 
“clearest” high-stakes policies were compared with those without high stakes, then 
over the most recent four-year period for which data were available, high-stakes 
testing regimes were associated with greater increases in NAEP scores. Moreover 
these effects were quite large (standardized effect size of 0.35 for 4th grade 
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mathematics, 0.79 for 8th grade mathematics, and 0.61 for 4th grade reading), 
especially in view of the relative insensitivity of NAEP tests to the effects of instruction 
as noted above, although the use of NAEP as the “anchor” for all these studies is a 
significant limitation. 
 
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) also re-examined the data used by Amrein and 
Berliner using more sophisticated methods, and found that in the states with the 
strongest accountability regimes, the increase in scores on NAEP from fourth grade in 
1996 to eighth grade in 2000 was three points (around 0.2 standard deviations) 
greater than in those with the weakest accountability regimes, holding other inputs 
and policies constant. They also found that “report cards” on school effectiveness 
were not a significant factor, suggesting that it was the direct effect of the incentives 
rather than the information provided about school performance that was producing 
the increase in achievement. However, while the net effect of accountability regimes 
was to increase student achievement, the effects were different for different 
minorities, with Hispanics gaining most, and African-Americans gaining least, so that 
the introduction of accountability regimes appears to widen, rather than narrow the 
achievement gap between white and African-American students.  
 
Rather than simply dichotomizing states as having either low-stakes or high stakes 
testing regimes, Carnoy and Loeb (2002) developed an index of the strength of the 
accountability system in place in each of the 50 United States that assigned a score 
between 0 (low) and 5 (high) according to a range of factors such as the number of 
grades in which testing was mandated, the repercussions for schools, the presence of 
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high school exit examinations and the length of time the accountability regime had 
been in place. Using the accountability index as a continuous variable in regression 
analyses, they found that stronger accountability regimes were associated with 
greater increases in NAEP scores at eighth grade (although not at fourth grade, which 
they considered surprising in view of the fact that gains in state test scores tend to be 
larger at fourth grade than eighth grade). For example, a two-step increase in the 
accountability index (e.g., from 1 to 3) was associated with an increase of 2.8 
percentage points in the proportion of white eighth-grade students classed as having 
reached the “basic” level on NAEP, and this was more than half the national increase 
over the same time period (1996 to 2000). In contrast to Raymond and Hanushek, 
Carnoy and Loeb found that high-stakes accountability regimes benefitted all 
minorities; for African-American students, a two step increase in the accountability 
index was associated with an increase of 5.1 percentage points (national average 
increase 5.7), and, for Hispanic students, larger still (8.9 percentage points compared 
to a national average increase of 6.1). Also in contradiction of the findings of Amrein 
and Berliner, they found no evidence of increased rates of retention, nor of lower rates 
of high school completion, although, perhaps surprisingly, increased achievement in 
mathematics achievement at eighth grade did not seem to lead to increased 
progression through high school. 
 
Braun (2004) undertook an extensive re-analysis of the performance of states from 
1992 to 2000 on NAEP at fourth and eighth grade. Using a variety of sophisticated 
models, he confirmed the earlier findings of Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and 
Carnoy and Loeb (2002), namely that high-stakes accountability regimes were 
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associated with greater increases in NAEP scores at eighth grade (but not at fourth 
grade). However, perhaps more importantly, he showed that the association between 
NAEP score gains and high-stakes testing regimes disappeared in cohort-based 
analyses. Reviewing 14 studies on the impact of accountability regimes (and 76 effect 
sizes derived therefrom), Lee (2008) showed that the average effect sizes for grade-
based (i.e., cross-sectional) analyses was 0.40, but was only 0.03 for cohort-based 
analyses. In addition, he pointed out that in describing effect sizes, it is important to 
be clear about whether the divisor in the calculation is the standard deviation of the 
state-level gain scores or the student-level scores. Recalculating all 76 effect size 
estimates in the 14 studies using student-level, as opposed to state-level, standard 
deviations produces a mean effect size across all the studies of just 0.08 standard 
deviations. While this might be regarded as a small effect when judged in terms of 
generally accepted interpretations of standardized effect sizes (Cohen, 1988), given 
that one year’s average growth is typically around 0.4 standard deviations, this effect 
equates to a 20% increase in educational productivity, which would have a substantial 
cash value if replicated across the entire United States. 
 
One of the problems with the research reviewed above is that the testing regimes 
were classified only in terms of the extent to which high stakes were attached to the 
outcomes of the test. Analyses by Bishop (2001a, b) showed that the nature of the 
tests is also important. Specifically, he found that students who were required to pass 
externally-set curriculum-based examinations—such as those found in New York and 
North Carolina, and indeed in most developed countries other than the United 
States—learned more than those who did not. 
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To summarize this section, although there is a need for more research, particularly 
into the impact of different kinds of tests, there is growing evidence that the impact of 
high-stakes assessments are not simply confined to performance on the tests 
themselves. The presence of high-stakes assessment systems appears to increase 
student achievement on a range of measures that are distal, or even remote, from the 
accountability tests. In most of the research cited above, the “reference instrument” 
has been NAEP tests, which were designed to be quite general measures of 
achievement, applicable in all states, despite the differences in curricula. The fact that 
the introduction of a high-stakes accountability system increases scores on NAEP as 
well as on state-mandated tests indicates that the effects of accountability tests 
generalize well beyond what is actually tested (Phelps, 2005). The immediate 
question, therefore, is whether there are additional costs that would outweigh the 
benefits. 
 
Unintended outcomes of accountability testing 
As the research on the impact of accountability testing has shown more and more 
clearly that, under a wide range of conditions, accountability testing can raise student 
achievement on a broad range of measures, much of the critique has focused on the 




Cizek (2005) identifies a range of unintended outcomes that have been claimed in 
critiques of accountability tests including a disproportionate focus on tested content, 
demoralization of teachers, and undue pressure on students. However, after 
identifying one study in two elementary schools that identified a range of issues that 
needed further exploration, he suggests that few, if any, of these studies provided 
strong support for the claim of adverse impact on student achievement: “In the case of 
high-stakes testing critiques […] the subsequent evidence collection appears to have 
become even more skimpy in support of conclusions that seem even more confident” 
(p. 28). 
 
Harlen and Deakin-Crick (2002) undertook a systematic review of the impact of tests 
and other standardized forms of assessment on students’ motivation for learning.  An 
initial search identified 183 potentially relevant studies of which 19 were found to be 
directly relevant to the focus of the review. Of the 19 studies, only 13 explicitly 
examined student outcomes (three randomized controlled trials, three case control 
designs, three post-test and four others). Although the authors claim strong evidence 
for a number of findings also found in other critiques (teachers emphasizing lower-
order skills, lowered self-image and increased anxiety for lower-achieving students, a 
shift from mastery-orientation to performance orientation and extrinsic motivation) 
most of the evidence for these negative effects was found in naturalistic studies that 
provided insufficient details of the context of data collection to generalize the findings. 
At this stage, therefore, the evidence about the negative effects of high-stakes testing 
would appear to be inconclusive. 
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There is evidence that high-stakes accountability testing makes it harder to keep 
teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Diaz, 2003), that teachers of disadvantaged 
students are likely to experience greater pressure to improve their test scores and to 
focus on test content than teachers of more advantaged students (Herman, Abedi & 
Golan, 1994), as well as a host of other unintended outcomes. However, given the 
evidence that accountability systems can have positive effects on student 
achievement, it would seem appropriate to explore whether the negative effects of 
high stakes assessment might be ameliorated, while still maintaining the positive 
impact described above. 
 
Improving high-stakes accountability tests 
There are a number of measures that could be taken to ameliorate some of the 
difficulties with high-stakes accountability testing identified above. However, until 
such measures are implemented and evaluated, any proposals would be at best 
tentative. Having said this, perhaps the most significant, and best developed, 
proposals in this regard have come from a group commissioned by the National 
Research Council (and funded by the National Science Foundation) to investigate the 
development of “instructionally-supportive accountability tests” (Popham, , Keller, 
Moulding, Pellegrino, & Sandifer, 2005). In its final report, the group made a number 
of recommendations for the improvement of high-stakes accountability testing in 




The group proposed a number of conditions that would need to be met if 
accountability tests were to be instructionally supportive. The first was a reduction in 
the number of curricular aims. They noted that in many states there can be more than 
fifty content standards for a subject at each grade, each of which can contain multiple 
aspects. They suggested that curricular aims should be defined more broadly around 
key concepts or ideas and ideally there should be only around a dozen or so such aims 
for each grade. The distillation of current content standards into such a small number 
of aims is clearly a far from trivial task. One possibility, discussed in some detail in the 
group’s report, involves the use of a “skill-by-concept” matrix. 
 
A group of science educators had agreed that in their teaching of physical science in 
middle school, there were four main concepts: characteristic physical properties and 
changes, characteristic chemical properties and changes, forces and motion, and forms 
of energy and energy transfer. In addition, they identified five “science-as-inquiry” 
skills (posing questions; designing investigations; gathering, analyzing and 
interpreting data; developing descriptions, explanations, predictions, and models; and 
thinking critically about links between evidence and explanation). Crossing the four 
concepts with the five skills generated a skill-by-concept matrix with 20 cells, a dozen 
of which might be selected for a particular grade. While the group acknowledges that 
a different group of educators would almost certainly generate a different skill-by-
concept matrix, the process identified above does appear to be a robust and general 
method “for deriving a modest number of high-import curricular foci from a state’s 
existing curricular aims in science.” (p. 138) 
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The second condition was that curricular aims should be expressed in language that is 
comprehensible to teachers. The group observed that where teachers do not 
understand the meaning of the curricular aims as expressed in the state’s content 
standards, they are likely to key their instruction on sets of test items relating to that 
standard, rather than to the aim that the items are intended to represent. They 
suggested that the assessment descriptions that that accompanied a content standard 
should be brief, written in straightforward language, and should include illustrative 
test items. 
 
The third condition was that the tests should be designed, and their results reported, 
in such a way that each student’s mastery of each curricular aim can be assessed with 
reasonable accuracy. Traditional considerations of validity (including reliability) 
would indicate that the tests should contain a number of items on each curricular aim. 
However, even a dozen or so curricular aims would be too many to assess in the 
limited amount of time available for statewide testing. Rather than increase the 
amount of time taken by testing, the group suggested that in any one year, only a few 
aims (i.e., three to five) would be assessed. To avoid the dangers of what they termed 
“curricular reductionism” (teachers teaching only those aims that were going to be 
tested), the group recommended that for a given year’s accountability test, all of the 
dozen or so curricular aims would be eligible for assessment, but the number actually 
assessed would be limited by the testing time available, and the need to adequately 
support inferences about the extent of each student’s mastery of each assessed aim 
(what they termed an “all concepts eligible, some concepts tested” approach). 
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 In terms of the tests themselves, they proposed that tests should be administered so 
that teachers had time to use the outcomes to inform their instruction, that the tests 
should include at least two classroom assessments for each curricular aim, and that 
the tests should be principally focused on mastery of concepts, rather than skills. The 
group recognized that, for reasons of economy, it would be necessary for the majority 
of items to be in selected-response format, but recommended that a modest 
proportion of the items should require constructed responses. To enable teachers to 
derive optimal instructional insights from the tests, the group also recommended that 
teachers should be provided with relevant professional development. Finally, in 
addition to the tests of science achievement, students should complete anonymously 
completed self-report inventories that teachers can use to gauge their students’ 
science-related attitudes and interests. 
 
As appendices to their report, the group offered a number of practical suggestions for 
taking this work forward. One appendix provided a number of illustrative items, each 
closely related to a particular cell in the “skill-by-concept” matrix discussed above. For 
example, for the cell that required students to develop descriptions, explanations, 
predictions, and models in the context of characteristic chemical properties and 
changes, the following item was proposed: 
 
“Iron rusting can be explained as a chemical change. What evidence can be used to 
support this explanation?” (p. 152) 
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A second appendix included an illustrative “Request for proposals” (RFP) that a state 
might release to potential contractors interested in providing instructionally 
supportive accountability tests in science. As well as the obvious test specifications, 
the RFP requires contractors to identify instructional suggestions for the teaching of 
areas that the level of performance on the test indicates are causing difficulties for 
students, how teachers are to be involved in the construction of the tests, and how 
students with special needs are to be assessed. 
 
Until such proposals are fully implemented in a state-wide testing context, whether 
these ideas are workable or not remains to be seen. There is also the question of 
whether such tests would really be more sensitive to the effects of instruction. At first 
sight, it would appear that they should be, in that they would relate very closely to a 
small number of curricular aims that would be, for that year, the clear focus of 
instruction, but again, this remains to be seen. However, the suggestions made by 
Popham et al. seem to be the most carefully thought through proposals for the 
creation of a system of high-stakes accountability tests that, as well as providing 
information about the levels of achievement in schools, could, at the same time, help 
teachers improve instruction. As such, they deserve serious consideration by all those 
involved in high-stakes accountability testing. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of this article is somewhat paradoxical. Because differences between 
schools account for only a small proportion of the variance in student scores (in most 
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countries, less than ten percent), standardized tests are rather inappropriate tools 
with which to hold districts, schools and teachers accountable. And yet, there is 
evidence that establishing an accountability regime that uses externally-set tests, 
where the results of these tests have significant consequences for students, teachers, 
schools and districts, can be a cost-effective way to increase student achievement, 
although the introduction of such regimes has the potential for a range of unintended 
outcomes, many of which will have a negative impact. 
 
The research reviewed in this article suggests that there is a case for the use of high-
stakes accountability tests, but that considerable work needs to done to minimize the 
costs and maximize the benefits of such regimes. This is a challenging agenda because, 
as Popham et al. (2005) acknowledge, it will require integrating a range of 
disciplinary perspectives, including economics, psychometrics, psychology, subject 
expertise, and knowledge of teacher professional development. Ultimately if we are to 
have high-stakes tests, the search must be for “tests worth teaching to” (Resnick, 
1987): accountability tests that are so closely aligned with desired outcomes that the 
only way to improve scores is to improve the desired outcomes.  
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